Collaboration between SAML Federations and OpenStack Clouds by Héder, Mihály et al.
Collaboration Between SAML Federations and OpenStack Clouds 
 
1 
COLLABORATION BETWEEN SAML FEDERATIONS AND  
OPENSTACK CLOUDS 
MIHÁLY HÉDER 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute for Computer Science and Control, 
Kende u. 13-17, Budapest, 1111, Hungary 
mihaly.heder@sztaki.mta.hu 
SZABOLCS TENCZER 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute for Computer Science and Control, 
Kende u. 13-17, Budapest, 1111, Hungary 
tenczer.szabolcs@sztaki.mta.hu 
ANDREA BIANCINI 
Consortium GARR, 
Via dei Tizii 6, Roma, 00185, Italy 
andrea.biancini@garr.it 
  
  
In this paper, we present the design process of a novel solution for enabling the collaboration 
between OpenStack cloud systems in SAML federations with standalone attribute authorities, such 
as national research and education federations or eduGAIN. The software solution that realizes the 
integration of systems serves as a case study to show how abstract desirable engineering properties 
fixed at the beginning of the design process can be implemented during the development phase. An 
analysis of earlier generations of OpenStack-related developments trying to tackle the same problem 
is given. Many aspects of this software integration can be generalized to serve as a template for 
federative cloud access. 
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1.   Introduction 
SAML
1
 identity and attribute federations are common in the research and education 
environment. They allow users to use their home institution credentials to access 
resources at partner institutions. This is achieved through the exchange of digitally signed 
XML
2
 assertions. There are three major roles in mature SAML federations: service 
providers (SPs),
3
 identity providers (IdPs),
4
 and attribute authorities (AAs).
5
 SPs provide 
resources for users. In this case study, The OpenStack
6
 cloud is such a resource, with 
OpenStack as the SP. Technically, it is not necessary to have a one-to-one mapping 
between a resource and an SP. For example, it is possible to build a system in which the 
command line access and the web access of OpenStack represent two different SPs in 
SAML. The opposite is also possible, for instance, a set of independent web resources 
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may be represented as one SP. IdPs are sources of user identity information that the SPs 
and AAs trust. Attribute authorities are sources of user attributes that SPs trust. User 
attributes include profile attributes (e.g. email, name, etc.) that users might control 
themselves, as well as authorization information managed by a community. Trust 
between these entities is pre-established through the exchange of signed metadata
7
 that 
contains signing keys, trusted network endpoints and administrative information. 
OpenStack is an open source, Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IAAS)
8
 cloud system that 
is designed to be modular. The focus of this paper is on the authentication and 
authorization functionalities of the OpenStack system, which are designed to be highly 
configurable and extensible. Initially, OpenStack did not support SAML federations. Yet, 
thanks to its modular design, integration with SAML systems can be achieved in multiple 
ways. There have been a number of previous integration efforts (detailed in Section 2 
Related Work) trying to resolve issues in this area. The two modules involved in the 
authentication and authorization process are Keystone,
9
 OpenStack’s authentication 
component, and Horizon,
10
 the system’s web interface. 
1.1.   Desirable engineering properties 
The software solution presented here is both new and original. It was developed to 
achieve a certain set of desirable engineering properties lacked by earlier solutions. One 
of these was encapsulation
11
 of new functionality within a self-contained module. This 
was especially important, because the alternative – implementing the functionality via 
source code patches to OpenStack – requires an update of the patches every time the host 
code changes. In the case of OpenStack’s half-year release cycle, the necessary changes 
would have been frequent. Also, the merging of the functionality to one of the OpenStack 
mainline components would have undermined its modularity, and the OpenStack 
developers we contacted also advised against it.  
Reuse of mature components
12
 was also targeted for development. This mostly 
involved the reuse of SAML-related software components. The handling of SAML 
protocol and metadata requires complex logic, and since these components implement 
authentication, the correct design and implementation is critical to security. As a result, 
the development of any SAML-related code was avoided.  
Full compatibility with SAML federations was set as a goal. This resulted in 
federated login, logout, the latest metadata defining the IdPs, metadata refresh, and the 
use of external attribute authorities, even multiple ones, in the same session. Compliance 
with legal requirements (such as the need of informed consent of attribute release) was 
also essential. 
Delegation of administration,
13
 in this case, user provisioning and authorization 
by external systems, was also achieved. SAML federations have a number of solutions 
for virtual organization and virtual group management
14
 that can be relied on. All of the 
above properties helped contribute to our overarching goal of easy, long-term operation 
and maintenance. 
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2.   Related Work 
As previously mentioned, there have been many, mostly unrelated, SAML integration 
initiatives in OpenStack that are relevant to the current work. 
 
(i) In 2012, David Chadwick from the University of Kent initiated a project to SAML-
enable Keystone and OpenStack.
15,16
 One drawback of this pioneering solution was 
that it did not include the reuse of existing middleware to handle the SAML protocol, 
but instead, it relied on SAML programming libraries to implement its own SAML 
functionality. As a result, it did not achieve full compatibility: it did not handle 
external attribute authorities, and it did not consume SAML metadata. This latter 
issue, however, leads to duplication of metadata. In this solution, OpenStack 
maintained a list of trusted IdPs in its own database format and did not rely on the 
federate metadata containing the same information in SAML XML. 
(ii) In 2014, as a part of the HEXAA17 project, Szabolcs Tenczer created a completely 
new solution
18
 based on Shibboleth
19
 as SAML middleware, and on OpenStack’s 
ability to rely on external authentication modules. Andrea Biancini from GARR also 
contributed to this solution. The results were presented at OpenStack CEE Day 
2015.
19
 The main issue with this solution was that its source code was not 
encapsulated, but acted as a patch for the main OpenStack codebase, and therefore, 
would require future significant maintenance. 
(iii) A completely new solution was included in the 2015-1 KILO20 release of OpenStack. 
The primary assignee of this project at OpenStack was Adam Young from Red Hat, 
with additional contributors from CERN and IBM.
21
 The approach was detailed at 
the OpenStack Cloud Identity Summit (slides 23–38). 22  
The solution is called WebSSO, a protocol-agnostic federation module that works 
with OpenID,
23
 SAML, and other protocols. As WebSSO does not include SAML-
related code, it makes it possible to encapsulate SAML functionality in a mature 
SAML middleware component. Shibboleth, mod_shib,
24
 and the resulting Apache 
environment is used for authentication. In this example, the Keystone module is 
defended with Shibboleth (in solution (ii) it was Horizon, the web module). Using 
the WebSSO solution with Shibboleth achieves full compatibility, reuse of mature 
components and encapsulation. However, it is not able to create users, tenants and 
projects within OpenStack. Therefore, each user must first be created in OpenStack 
before s/he can login via WebSSO. As a result, the WebSSO solution does not fully 
achieve delegation of administration. The software solution described in this paper 
suggests a converged solution to overcome this, based on WebSSO. 
(iv) There is also Keystone-to-Keystone SAML flow, supported by OpenStack. In this, 
Keystone acts as an IdP, and another Keystone instance as SP (see the OpenStack 
Cloud Identity Summit presentation (slide 40).
22
 This solution is not compatible with 
SAML federations, as it does not consume SAML metadata, and also does not reuse 
mature components. However, it might be a viable solution for a completely 
different use case, in which an OpenStack user database is the identity source to be 
trusted by a federation. 
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3.   Software Design 
Our solution required a number of software design decisions to be made based on the 
design criteria outlined in the introduction. The most important was that OpenStack 
should be used in combination with TRL
25
 9 SAML middleware, so that proper handling 
of SAML-level actions were not demanded from OpenStack itself. This includes: (a) 
metadata handling, as per eduGAIN or other federation requirements, with signature 
verification, (b) handling of stand-alone AAs, (c) collaboration with discovery services, 
and (d) SAML single logout. As previously discussed, using OpenStack with mature 
SAML middleware achieved our goal of reusing mature components. 
Moreover, it was important that the new software should not only be a patch to 
the OpenStack Horizon or Keystone components. Because of the encapsulation of new 
functionality in its own module, no regular patching of any other OpenStack components 
will be necessary. Python and Django were selected for consistency with other 
OpenStack components. 
It was also important to align the software with the OpenStack Keystone 
project’s vision for the future. At the OpenStack CEE Day 2015 event, a converged 
solution for the future was agreed with the head of the Keystone project, Morgan 
Fainberg. From the solution (ii), the user/project creation part would be separated into a 
standalone ‘signup page’ web application, using Keystone API calls, and the 
user/project/tenant created at signup, if necessary. The mainline code would then perform 
the rest of the authentication and map the SAML session to Keystone users. The rest of 
the (ii) solution would be discontinued, and Horizon would not be patched in the future. 
Fainberg indicated that the OpenStack Keystone project is open to accept improvement 
patches to (iii) as long as they do not involve user/tenant creation (or de-provisioning). 
The solution needed to ensure that the user is always properly provisioned into 
Keystone before it makes contact with OpenStack. Otherwise, the user would 
successfully login into Shibboleth federation middleware, but would be denied access and 
greeted with an error message from Keystone. According to our design criteria, this 
should not be implemented in a hook of an OpenStack module. As a result, we relied on 
the sessionHook
26
 ability of Shibboleth SP. 
The software also needed to include the means to request user consent, achieved by 
a website presented to the user, if necessary. The resulting software, regsite, in 
collaboration with WebSSO (see Section 2, Related Work), implements the desirable 
engineering properties. 
3.1.   Main workflow 
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Figure 1 presents the main workflow of regsite. This workflow implements a 
collaboration between a SAML IdP, several SAML AAs, the SAML SP protecting 
Keystone, regsite, and finally, Horizon. 
 
 
The workflow steps are as follows: 
(i) The user tries to access the OpenStack Horizon web interface with a web browser. 
(ii) Horizon redirects the user to the Keystone component’s web endpoint. 
(iii) The Keystone component is hosted by an Apache web server and is guarded by a 
Shibboleth SP. The user does not have a Shibboleth session yet, therefore a SAML 
login sequence is initiated. The user forwarded to a SAML IdP discovery service, 
where s/he can select an identity provider. 
(iv) The discovery service forwards the user to the IdP. 
(v) The user logs in at the identity provider using his/her home institutional credentials. 
(vi) Additional profile attributes, and authoritative information is gathered from external 
attribute authorities, as defined by the SP’s configuration. The number of AAs 
contacted can range from 0 to many, however, the SP sequentially queries the AAs, 
which aggregates the round-trip times of the single queries. Meanwhile, the user is 
blocked, which suggests that querying more than five AAs is not practical.  
Fig. 1: The main workflow of the collaboration between SAML federations and OpenStack. 
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(vii) Shibboleth SP merges and filters the received attributes, then executes its configured 
sessionHook. It forwards the user to a location hosted on the same server as the SP, 
which also relays all the attributes gathered during the login process. In sessionHook, 
Shibboleth SP passes over the identity, profile and authoritative information to 
regsite. Steps (iii) to (vii) can all be completed by a standard Shibboleth SP.  
(viii) regsite creates the user and the tenant, if necessary, using Keystone API calls. 
(ix) regsite directs the user back into the Shibboleth login sequence.  
(x) The Shibboleth login sequence finishes, and the user finally reaches Keystone. The 
same set of information is passed in Apache Environment variables to Keystone, as 
in Step (vii), to regsite. 
(xi) Step (viii) ensures that the user is already existent in Keystone, as well as the tenants 
they are assigned to, therefore, Keystone successfully authenticates the user. 
(xii) Keystone creates a token for the user. 
(xiii) Keystone redirects the user to the Horizon web interface, accompanied by the newly 
created token. Horizon authenticates the user using this token and access is granted. 
4.   Implementation 
The regsite implementation fulfils all the design requirements. It is a stand-alone 
Django
27
 web application, designed to be run in an Apache web server and to be 
protected by Shibboleth. Although this possibility is outside the scope of the work 
discussed in this paper, theoretically, regsite should work with other SAML middleware 
and web server, and even in non-SAML scenarios. 
The invocation of regsite into the login process is done by the Shibboleth 
sessionHook capability. The following XML start tag shows how the sessionHook is 
enabled in the shibboleth2.xml configuration. 
 
<ApplicationDefaults 
entityID="https://openstack.example.com/shibboleth" 
sessionHook="/regsite"> 
 
A federate identifier, an entitlement (authoritative information), and an optional 
mail attribute from the Shibboleth middleware are received by regsite. The name of the 
actual attributes are configurable. A common setting is to use eduPersonPrincipalName
28
 
for the identifier, eduPersonEntitlement
29
 or isMemberOf
30
 for the entitlement, and mail
31
 
for the email address. 
Mapping federate user identifiers to Keystone users is done by the following 
JSON configuration snippet. In this example, eduPersionPrincipalName (referenced in its 
abbreviated form: eppn) is used as a federate identifier. The local part of this 
configuration describes the Keystone user account (that is, local in relation to Keystone). 
The remote part identifies the federate user.  
{ 
"mapping": { 
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        "rules": [ 
            { 
                "local": [ 
                    { 
                        "user": { 
                            "domain": { 
                                "id": "default" 
                            }, 
                            "type": "local", 
                            "name": "{0}" 
                        } 
                    } 
                ], 
                "remote": [ 
                    { 
                        "type": "eppn" 
                    } 
                ] 
            } 
        ] 
    } 
} 
 
The identifier received from the middleware will be used without modification 
by OpenStack. From the entitlement information, projects and roles are derived in the 
following way: 
<entilement_prefix>:project:role 
 
Divided by the colon (:), the segments are used to represent the project and role, 
which are OpenStack resources. There might be other colons in the entitlement prefix, 
but the software always uses the last two segments. Both the project and the role is 
created, as necessary. In case of multiple entitlement attributes (separated by semicolons), 
all of values are used. The logic of user, role and project creation by regsite is shown in 
Figure 2. 
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Fig. 2 The flowchart of regsite user, role and project provisioning process 
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In the process shown in Figure 2, only the following, nine Keystone API calls are used by 
regsite to create users, roles and projects:  
users.list, roles.list, projects.list, projects.create, 
roles.create, users.create, roles.grant, roles.revoke, 
users.update 
As Keystone API is the only interface between regsite and Keystone, loose 
coupling is achieved. The registration confirmation page allows for requesting user 
consent before the actual user registration happens. At this point, the user can abandon 
the process before any data is relayed to OpenStack. This functionality ensures legal 
compliance. There are use cases in which the consent is acquired by other means, and 
also there are intra-organization use cases where consent is not necessary, as there is no 
new party involved. Therefore, this feature can be turned off by configuration. 
5.   Conclusion and Future Work 
This paper presented a new method of collaboration between OpenStack cloud systems 
and mature SAML federations. Such collaboration was made possible by the modular 
design of OpenStack, which supports customized authentication and authorization, and 
by the generic nature of Shibboleth SAML middleware.  
The discussed solution exhibits key engineering properties essential for long-
term operation of deployed systems and maintenance of regsite code. Encapsulation of 
the new functionality necessary for the integration of OpenStack cloud systems and 
mature SAML federations is key for source code maintenance, while the reuse of mature 
components helps to minimize the size of that source code. Full compatibility with 
SAML ensures that the services provided by the federation – i.e. metadata distribution, 
discovery services, single login, and single logout – can be used. The fact that there is a 
very loose coupling between the systems, e.g. Shibboleth hides all SAML-related actions 
from OpenStack, and regsite relies on a small portion of Keystone API, ensures that the 
inevitable evolution of SAML federations and OpenStack will not endanger the easy 
maintenance of the collaboration.  
However, this work is far from complete. Further research is needed in the area 
of user deprovisioning. Currently, new users of the federation with the correct 
permissions can access the resources in OpenStack, and their corresponding user 
accounts are created, as required, in the system. When users are no longer entitled to use 
the cloud, they will also be denied access to those resources. This is achieved by the 
collaboration of Shibboleth, regsite and OpenStack. However, the resources themselves 
will not be freed up, e.g. the virtual machines will not stop once a user’s permissions 
have ceased. This is a very complex issue. First, there needs to be a policy in place to 
handle revoked rights. The immediate stop or deletion of resources that might include 
valuable data is probably unacceptable in most cases. A grace period and/or archival 
solution is necessary. Another challenge is the notification of the cloud system when a 
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change is made to a user’s entitlements in the SAML federation. This can follow a push 
or a pull model, for example, regsite could periodically pull the entitlements of known 
users in order to update OpenStack. Another solution is to implement an endpoint that 
can be notified by the group/virtual organization manager software of any changes.  
Another area of future work relates to enabling command line access (CLI) while 
maintaining the properties of the integration, especially maintaining the reuse of mature 
components and loose coupling (that is, enabling CLI access without adding SAML-
handling code to OpenStack). The issue stems from the fact that SAML is primarily 
designed for web resources.  
One simple solution would be to extend regsite’s user-facing web interface to 
provide a token for the user to use on CLI. SAML protects regsite, where users are both 
authenticated and authorized, so the proper token could be requested from Keystone on 
users’ behalf. The users would then need to copy the token from the web and use them in 
the command line client. Alternatively, users could set up their own passwords in regsite 
for use on CLI, (although this password could not be used for web access, which is 
handled by Shibboleth). A more complex solution would involve relying on ECP. 
However, not every SAML IdP is ECP-enabled. Discovery and the querying of attribute 
authorities are also unresolved in this setup.  
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